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SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN IN THE
WORKPLACE: HE SAID, SHE SAID
Throughout the history of our nation, ingrained notions of ine-
quality based on sex have persisted in many forms.' Nowhere is
See The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Early confirmation of
women's inequality can be seen in the gender-biased terminology of The Declaration of
Independence, which states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness . . .that to secure these rights, Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed ....
Id. Many of the Framers of the Declaration, including Thomas Jefferson, strongly believed
that men and women were, and should be, on unequal footing. See WILLIAM F. PEPPER &
FLORYANCE R. KENNEDY. SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 2 (1981). Thomas Jefferson
contended that it was imperative to exclude women from the activities and obligations of
men " 'to prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity of issues . . . ' which would result if
they joined in the deliberations of men." Id.; see also EDMUND S. MORGAN. THE MEANING OF
INDEPENDENCE 61 (1976). When asked whether women should be allowed to hold public
office, President Jefferson replied that neither he nor society was ready for such an imagi-
native concept. Id.; CALEB P. PATTERSON. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 3 (1953) (Jefferson's view on legal education excluded women). See generally Sarah
E. Burns, Note, Apologia for the Status Quo: Gender Justice, 74 GEO. LJ. 1791, 1814-15 (1986)
(commenting that phrase "all men are created equal" intimates that every white male was
equal to exclusion of women); Patricia A. Cain, Note, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24
GA. L REV. 803, 816-17 (1990) (while Declaration of Independence set forth notion of equal-
ity, society still considered women subordinate to men); Christine A. Littleton, Note,
Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043, 1050 (1987) (noting that termi-
nology used in Declaration of Independence excluded women).
In addition, up until the early twentieth century, the law essentially endorsed such ine-
quality by equating women to chattels. See, e.g., LEMUEL H. FOSTER. THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF
WOMEN 29-30 (1986) (stipulating that husband had action in trespass against another who
committed adultery with his wife); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1286-87 (1991) [hereinafter Reflections] (laws were founded
at time when women were denied opportunity to read, write, and vote, as they were consid-
ered property); David Bryden, Note, Between Two Constitutions: Feminism and Pornography, 2
CONST. COMMENT. 147, 152-53 (1985) (society's tolerance of wife-beating and rape reflects
its equating women to mere possessions); Regina Cahan, Comment, Home is No Heaven: An
Analysis of Sexual Harassment in Housing, 1987 WIs. L. REV. 1061, 1081-83 (1987) (describ-
ing case where woman found to have been treated as sexual chattel by landlord); Neal
Devins, Note, GenderJustice and its Critics, 76 CAL. L REV. 1377, 1402 (1988) ("Under the
common law, where divorce was impossible, the wife was always her husband's chattel."
(citing John D. Johnston Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, 47 N.Y.U L. REV.
(1972))): See JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH. CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 219-22 (3d.
ed. 1984) (noting that women were equated to chattel); KATHLEEN W. PERATIS & EVE CARY.
WOMEN & THE LAW 1 (1977) (same). But see Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in
America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 471-72 (1989) (women in 1920s were no longer considered
chattels and need not plead protection from court).
Not all women accepted being treated as possessions, as evidenced by Abigail Adams's
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this discrimination more evident than in the workplace,' where
women are silent witnesses to subtle and destructive acts of sexual
harassment.3 Although Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act"
letters to her husband. See PERITIS & CAREY, supra, at 1-2. Abigail Adams expressed to
John Adams that "in the new code of laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to
make, I desire you would remember the ladies and be more generous and favorable to
them than your ancestors." Id. at 1. Additionally, Abigail Adams warned that if women did
not receive such recognition under the new code of laws, they would rise up in protest. Id.
at 1-2. This opposition was later espoused by the first feminist movement in 1848. Id. at 7-
8. The female participants adopted what is known as the Seneca Falls Declaration, which in
pertinent part, reads:
When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one portion of the
family of man to assume among the people of the earth a position different from
that which they have hitherto occupied, but one to which the laws of nature and of
nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that
they should declare the causes that impel them to such a course.
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal
Id. at 9.
1 See Fran Sepler, Comment, Sexual Harassment: From Protective Response to Proactive Pre-
vention, II HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 61, 61 (1990). There was rarely a distinction made
between women who sold their bodies for labor and those who sold them for sex. Id. The
Sepler article states that "[wiorking women were forced to endure manifestations of the
prevailing societal attitude; that 'the distinction between women who sold their labor and
women who sold their bodies was not often made.'" Id. (quoting Jill Goodman, Sexual
Harassment: Some Observations on the Distance Travelled and the Distance Yet to Go, I 0 CAP. U.
L. REV. 445, 449 (1981)); see also Eleanor K. Bratton, The Eye of the Beholder: an Interdiscipli-
nary Examination of Law and Social Research on Sexual Harassment, 17 N.M. L. REV- 91, 91
n.2 (1987) (same); Nancy Brown, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Clarifying The Standards
Of Hostile tworking Environment Sexual Harassment, 25 Hous. L. REV. 441, 441 (1988) (same).
Devaluating women's role in the workplace has been viewed as a way to keep women in
their place. See Reflections, supra note 1, at 1281. Power has often been viewed as an inte-
gral part of sexual harassment. Id.; see also Susan M. Mathews, Title VII and Sexual Harass-
ment: Beyond Damages Control, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINtsM 299, 308 (1991) (noting that curing
sexual harassment would entail altering power dynamic in workplace); Deborah L. Rhode,
The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change, 100 YALE LJ. 1731,
1732 (1991) (discussing how women are universally underpaid in comparison to men);
Daniel Goleman, Sexual Harassment: It's About Power, Not Lust, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1991, at
CI (in wake of Clarence Thomas's controversial confirmation proceedings "researchers
found that [sexual harassment] has less to do with sex than with power"). See generally
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977). In Dothard, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that a female security guard would be unable to maintain order due to the physical
and emotional attributes of her sex, thereby acquiescing to the stereotype that women are
the "weaker sex." Id.
Additionally, sexual harassment left women powerless in the workplace. See Reflections,
supra note 1, at 1281 (women were precluded from participating in fashioning legal institu-
tions that governed both men and women because women were powerless); Rhode, supra,
at 1755 (females in subordinate positions who feel powerless to alter their situation con-
vince themselves that gender inequality is not unjust); Sepler, supra, at 61 ("[W]omen
spend much of their work life at the mercy of and subject to the decisions of men in super-
visory positions.").
0 See Goleman, supra note 2, at Cl. Most women do not speak out on sexual harassment
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was enacted in an attempt to alleviate all forms of discrimination
in the workplace,5 it failed to include sexual harassment within its
definition of sex discrimination.6 As a result, courts initially re-
fused to recognize sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination.'
for fear that their complaints would only create more problems and result in their being
labeled troublemakers. Id. Furthermore, women tend to keep silent in order to maintain a
friendly working environment. Id. Studies have shown that a di minimus percentage of
sexually harassed women make formal complaints. Id.; see also Marion G. Crain, Feminizing
Unions: Challenging the Gender Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1163 n.312
(1991) ("Masculine discourse dominates the conversational space, thus generating male so-
cial constructs that in turn further women's silence." (quoting Robin West, Feminism, Criti-
cal Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F. 59, 72)); Rita H. Jensen & Rorie Sherman,
Thomas Confirmed: Sex Harassment in Focus, 14 NAT'L. L.J. 13, 13 (1991) ("Many female
attorneys who believe they are suffering sexual harassment at their workplace simply move
on and keep quiet ...."). But see Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism, and the
Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 STAN L REv. 607, 620-38
(1987) (women subjected to sexual abuse openly discuss their mistreatment).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating "against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.; see Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). The Supreme Court concluded that the
purpose of Title VII was to promote equal employment opportunities and to eliminate
barriers to equality in the workplace. Id.; see also Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d. 599, 603
(7th Cir. 1985) (concluding employers are prohibited by Title VII from "imposing sexual
consideration as a condition of employment"); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,
902 (11 th Cir. 1982) (stating that "[slexual harassment ... is every bit the arbitrary barrier
to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality").
' See Sharon M. Easley, Note, Employers and Employees: Meritor Savings Band v. Vinson:
Needed Ammunition for the Fight Against Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 40 OKLA. L. REV.
305, 307 (1987) (noting that sexual harassment is not depicted as actionable Title VII
claim), Suzanne Egan, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: Title VII Liability for Sexual
Harassment, 17 GOLDEN GATE U. L REV. 379, 380 (1987) (discussing how courts have con-
strued Title VlI to prohibit employer discrimination which serves to deny employment);
Barbara L. Zalucki, Comment, Discrimination Law-Defining the Hostile Work Environment
Claim of Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, II W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 143, 144-45 (1989)
(indicating that E.E.O.C. has recognized sexual harassment as viable Title VII claim, even
though Congress has never expressly prohibited sexual harassment); see also Meritor Sav-
ings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986). In Meritor, Justice Rehnquist noted
that "[t]he prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title VII at the
last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives[,] . . . [TIhe bill quickly passed as
amended, [thereby leaving] little legislative history to guide [the courts] in interpreting the
Act's prohibitions against discrimination based on 'sex.' " Id.; Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d
872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Congress added the word 'sex' to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representatives."); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986-87 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (amendment aimed at prohibiting sex dis-
crimination passed despite opponents' attempts to block bill (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2577
(1964) (remarks of Representative Smith))).
' See, e.g., Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 461 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
The Munford court, in examining the purpose of Title VII, decided that for employment
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In response to this resistance, the Equal Employment Opportu-
practices as constituting sex discrimination they must evolve from a company policy that
aims at depriving women of employment opportunities. Id. The court, therefore, con-
cluded that Title VII did not regard sexual harassment by co-workers as constituting sex
discrimination. Id.; see Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(maintaining that Title VII did not cover sexual harassment among co-workers, with liabil-
ity attaching only when conduct constituted unlawful employment practice), rev'd, 600 F.2d
211 (9th Cir. 1979); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (1975) ("[Tjhere is
nothing in the [EEOC] Act which could reasonably be construed to have it apply to 'verbal
and physical sexual advances' by another employee."), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977);
see also McDonald v. Sante Fe Train Trans. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976) (limiting
Title VII to racial discrimination only). Title VII intended to "cover white men and white
women and all Americans." 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (remarks of Representative Cel-
ler). It created "an obligation not to discriminate against whites." Id. (memorandum of
Senator Clark); cf Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434 (citing E.E.O.C.'s narrow interpretation of Title
VII at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)). See generally ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORK-
PLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 29-30 (1990) (initially courts were hesitant to extend standards
used to afford recovery for racially hostile work environment to sexual harassment cases
because sexual harassment was found to be normal condition of employment); Brown,
supra note 2, at 442 (initial efforts to persuade courts to recognize sexual harassment as
proper Title VII claim were fruitless); Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Note, Em-
ployer Liability for Co-worker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc.
CHANGE 83, 85 (1984) (federal courts rejected sexual harassment claims under Title VII for
ten years and then limited early claims to "quid pro quo").
However, courts slowly began to recognize sexual harassment within the meaning of Ti-
tle VII. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Bundy Court was
the first court to recognize both forms of sexual harassment. Id. In Bundy, plaintiff asserted
that the sexually stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions she was subjected to re-
sulted in a "condition of employment" actionable as a Title VII discrimination claim. Id. at
943-44. The court accepted plaintiff's argument and held that regardless of whether plain-
tiff lost any tangible job benefit, sexual harassment was actionable due to the existing, abu-
sive working environment. Id. at 945-46; see also Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 636,
643 (N.D. Ohio 1986) (noting that Bundy was first court to acknowledge "viability of sexual
harassment claims under Title VII"); Michelle Ridgeway Pierce, Sexual Harassment and Ti-
tle VI-A Better Solution, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1071, 1082 (1989) (D.C. Circuit was among first to
recognize hostile environment sexual harassment claim); John T. Shapiro, The Call for Cam-
pus Conduct Policies: Censorship Or Constitutionally Permissible Limitations on Speech, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 201, 223 n.101 (1990) (environmental sexual harassment analysis was first recog-
nized by D.C. Circuit in Bundy); Marlisa Vinciguerra, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search For
Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1725-26 (1989) (indicating
that D.C. Circuit was first to identify hostile environment sexual harassment as proper Ti-
tle VII claim); Zalucki, supra note 6, at 149 (same).
Due to the highly publicized confirmation proceedings of Justice Clarence Thomas,
women, in addition to the courts, have become more outraged with, and aware of, sexual
harassment in the workplace. See Priscilla Painton, Woman Power, TIME, Oct. 28, 1991, at
24. Since the Thomas hearings, women have threatened retaliation: "We will no longer
beg for our rights from men in power. We will replace them and take power ourselves." Id.
(quoting Patricia Ireland, Executive Vice President of the National Organization for
Women); see also Marcia Chambers, Defining the Social Labels We Live By, NAT'L. L.J., Oct.
28, 1991, at 15 (as women have become potent force in all spheres of society, they have
demanded "the right to work unmolested" (quoting Anna Quindlen, Public and Private;
Listen to Us, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1991, at 25)) .
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nity Commission ("E.E.O.C."), promulgated guidelines to assist
courts on issues concerning sexual harassment." These guidelines
described two forms of sexual harassment.' The first form, known
as quid pro quo, is found where tangible job benefits are condi-
tioned upon the submission to sexual advances.10 Quid pro quo
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985). The E.E.O.C. guidelines provide in relevant part:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII. Unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individuals's employ-
ment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
Id.
Although the courts are not required to follow the guidelines set forth by the E.E.O.C.,
they have found them to be beneficial. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; Gutierrez v. Municipal
Court of Southeast Judicial Dist., 838 F.2d 1031, 1048 (9th Cir. 1988) (although guidelines
not binding on courts, they "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance"); Nance v. Union Carbide
Corp., 540 F.2d 718, 728 (4th Cir. 1976) (interpretation of Civil Rights Act by E.E.O.C.
not binding, but entitled to great deference by courts (explaining Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-
34)); Vulcan Soc'y City of New York Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of City of New
York, 490 F.2d 387, 400 (2d Cir. 1973) (courts not obligated to follow E.E.O.C. guidelines,
but they have been used as "helpful summary of professional testing standards in . . . Title
VII cases"); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 712 F. Supp. 242, 256 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1989) (although courts not bound by E.E.O.C. guidelines, they have used them for guid-
ance in judicial decision making). But see Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Serv.,
528 F.2d 508, 518 (5th Cir. 1976) (rejecting wholesale use of E.E.O.C. guidelines in Title
VlI cases). See generally ARTHUR LAKSON & Li LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §
41.62 (1987) (sexual harassment universally recognized as violation of Title VII).
' See Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 575 (10th Cir. 1990)
(courts have interpreted Title VII to prohibit both quid quo pro and hostile environment
sexual harassment); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 782 (1st Cir. 1990) (rec-
ognizing quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment as proper Title VII
claims): Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1344 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting quid
pro quo and hostile environment as two distinct forms of sexual harassment); Steele v.
Offshore Shipbuilding Inc., 867 F.2d. 1311, 1315 (11 th Cir. 1989) (same); Montgomery
County Comm'n v. Montgomery County Sheriff's Dep't, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1067 (M.D.
Ala. 1990) (same); see also Kevin T. Kramer, Relieffor Health-Related Injury in Sexual Harass-
ment Cases, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 171, 174 (1990) (E.E.O.C. guidelines ac-
knowledge quid pro quo and hostile environment as two forms of sexual harassment ac-
tionable under Title VII); Catherine A. O'Neill, Sexual Harassment Cases and the Law of
Evidence, 1989 U. CHI LEGAL F. 218, 219 (1989) (guidelines published by E.E.O.C. specifi-
cally accept quid pro quo and hostile environment as two types of sexual harassment
claims); Susan R. Klein, Comment, A Survey of Evidence and Discovery Rules in Civil Sexual
Harassment Suits with Special Emphasis on California Law, 11 INDUS. REL. LJ. 540, 561-62
(1989) (quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment are two basic forms of
sexual harassment).
"0 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1988). Quid pro quo sexual harassment occurs when
"submission to or rejection on such conduct . . . is used as the basis for employment deci-
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sexual harassment is an issue that has largely been settled, since
job benefits are either contingent upon sexual favors or not.1
The second form, hostile environment sexual harassment, exists
when an employee's work environment is disrupted by sexual con-
duct which adversely affects the employee's performance or
mental health. 2 It is asserted that hostile environment sexual har-
sion[s. Id.: Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (describing quid pro quo as exchange of economic
benefit for sexual favors); see also Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1991)
(recognizing quid pro quo as appropriate workplace discrimination claim under Title VII);
Collins v. Baptist Memorial Geriatric Ctr., 937 F.2d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1991) (quid pro quo
theory "involves job benefits conditioned on the acceptance of the [sexual] harassment"),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 968 (1992); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 968 (10th Cir.
1991) (finding that female security guard not subject to quid pro quo sexual harassment
because she was "not required to submit to sexual conduct or harassment to keep her
job"): Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures Inc., 913 F.2d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1990) (sexual
harassment "describes situations in which submission to sexual demands is made a condi-
tion of tangible employment benefits"); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 879, 908-09
(11 th Cir. 1982) (same); Kimberly A. Mango, Students Versus Professors: Combatting Sexual
Harassment Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN L REv. 355, 356
(1991) (quid pro quo "targets the conditioning of benefits on the submission to sexual de-
mands"). See generally Mathews, supra note 2, at 319 (some courts feel that quid pro quo
sexual harassment is more serious problem than hostile environment sexual harassment);
BI.ACK'S LAW DIc'rIoNARY 1123 (5th ed. 1979) (defining quid pro quo as "giving one valua-
ble thing for another").
"' See supra note 10: infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text (discussing quid pro quo
sexual harassment).
12 See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a). The E.E.O.C. asserts that environmental sexual harass-
ment is established when alleged misconduct "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment." Id.; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (environmental sexual
harassment exists as form of sex discrimination when "hostile or abusive work environ-
ment" has been created): Morris v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 941 F.2d 710, 713-14 (8th
Cir. 1991) (acknowledging hostile environment form of sexual harassment); Wilson v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 273 (5th Cir. 1991) (environmental sexual harassment
exists when working atmosphere becomes abusive to women); Cindy A. Rowe, Standards
For Sexual Harassment in a Hostile Environment: Brooms v. Regal Tube Company, 32 B.C. L
REV. 263, 264 (1990) (noting Supreme Court "recognized that sexual harassment consti-
tutes illegal sex descrimination in the workplace"); Martha Sperry, Hostile Environment Sex-
ual Harassment and the Imposition of Liability Without Notice: A Progressive Approach to Tradi-
tional Gender Roles and Power Based Relationships, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 917, 920-21 (1991)
(hostile environment sexual harassment is generated by existence of abusive work environ-
ment): Andrea B. Wapner, Sexual Harassment in the Law Firm, 16 LAW PRAC MGMT. 42, 43-
44 (1990). "Hostile environment occurs when pervasive unwelcome sexual conduct or sex-
based ridicule unreasonably interferes with an individual's job performance or creates an
intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment, even if it leads to no tangible or
economic job consequences." Id.; cf. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 221
(1989) (hostile environment is form of racial harassment actionable under Title VII);
White v. Federal Express Corp., 939 F.2d 157, 160 (4th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff's allegations of
racially hostile environment established prima facie case under Title VII); Woods v.
Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1200-03 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that unions
632
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assment is not as straightforward as quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment. To acsertain if a hostile environment sexual harassment
claim exists, not only must a uniform definition of sexual harass-
ment be developed, but also a particular legal perspective must be
utilized to determine whether the conduct constitutes such
harassment."1
This Note will examine the levels of conduct which constitute
hostile environment sexual harassment. It will discuss whether the
standards adopted by the courts properly evaluate conduct in light
of the purpose of Title VII and will recommend that the proper
viewpoint to use in ascertaining misconduct is the reasonable vic-
tim perspective. Furthermore, this Note will propose that in order
to comply with the ambit of Title VII, the misconduct should be
evaluated in an abuse-free environment and not according to the
amount of harassment that exists in the particular workplace. In
addition, it will analyze employers' liability with respect to quid
pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. Finally, this
Note will suggest that in hostile environment claims, a bifurcated
approach should be taken toward employer liability: employers
would be strictly liable for a supervisor's misconduct and liable in
negligence for the misconduct of its other employees.
I. CONDUCT AND PERSPECTIVES IN HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS
A. Conduct
In formulating a standard of proof to determine the viability of
could be liable under Title VII for intentionally declining to file certain individual's com-
plaints based on racially hostile working environment); Rogers v. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission, 454 F.2d 234, 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1971) (hostile environment claims
recognized under title VII in context of race discrimination); Ellen E. Lange, Racist Speech
on Campus: A Title VII Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 64 S. CAL. REV. 105, 122 (1990)
(racial insults and other physical conduct relating to individual's national origin constitute
environmental racial harassment when such conduct creates hostile working atmosphere).
iS See LIN FARLEY. SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB
15 (1978) (sexual harassment may include "staring at, commenting upon, or touching a
woman's body; requests for acquiescence in sexual behavior; repeated nonreciprocated pro-
positions for dates; demands for sexual intercourse; and rape"); CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON,
SEXUAl. HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979) [hereinafter WORKING WOMEN] (sexual
harassment "refers to the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a
relationship of unequal power").
633
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a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, courts have uti-
lized Title VII's prohibitions which require the misconduct to af-
fect a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment.14 The fun-
damental issue that arises is what amount of harassment is
necessary to affect a "term, condition, or privilege" of employ-
ment. 15 This issue first reached the United States Supreme Court
in 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 6 in which the Su-
preme Court set forth various standards for determining when
hostile environment sexual harassment exists.1 7
In Meritor, respondent Mechelle Vinson brought an action
against her manager, Sidney Taylor, and her employer, Meritor
Savings Bank, alleging that Taylor had sexually harassed her.1 8
Vinson testified that over a three-year period Taylor made re-
peated demands for sexual favors during and after working hours,
fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the
14 See, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05. The standards of proof developed by the courts
require that the plaintiff allege and prove that: "(a) the employee belongs to a protected
group ... (b) the employee was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment . . . (c) the harass-
ment complained of was based upon sex . . . (d) the harassment complained of affected a
'term, condition, or privilege' of employment. . . (e) Respondeat Superior .. " Id.; see also
Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749-50 (8th Cir. 1986). To determine whether a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim existed, the Moylan court looked to such stan-
dards as whether the employee was a member of a protected group; whether the employee
was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; whether the harassment was based upon sex;
whether the harassment affected a "term, condition or privilege" of employment; and
"whether the employer knew or should have known of the harassment ... and failed to
take proper remedial action." Id.; Halasi-Schmick v. City of Shawnee, Kan., 759 F. Supp.
747, 751 (D. Kan. 1991) (same); Volk v. Coler, 638 F. Supp. 1555, 1557-58 (C.D. III. 1986)
(same), rev'd, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988).
"8 See Howard v. Dep't of the Air Force, 877 F.2d 952, 956 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (conduct
which rises to level of sexual harassment must affect term, condition, or privilege of em-
ployment); Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 428 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that Title VII ren-
dered discriminatory those practices which affect employee's term, condition, or privilege
of employment); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 905 (1 1th Cir.
1988) (after satisfying Henson elements, plaintiff must also prove that "pattern of sexual
harassment subject[ed] her to disparate treatment with respect to terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment"); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir.
1986) (plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of sexual harassment as alleged conduct
was not "so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it affected the 'terms, conditions, or
privileges' of her employment"). See generally P.J. Murray, Beware of 'Hostile Environment'
Sexual Harassment, 26 DuQ. L. REV. 461, 464 (1988) ("threshold question" is what conduct
is grave enough to affect "term, condition, or privilege" of employment).
10 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
'7 See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (outlining standards advanced by major-
ity for determining actionable misconduct).
18 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
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women's restroom where he exposed himself to her, and even for-
cibly raped her on several occasions.19 The district court denied
relief, finding the relationship between Vinson and Taylor was
voluntary and that the alleged harassment had little to do with
Vinson's employment or advancement in the bank.20 The court of
appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that a violation of Ti-
tle VII could be based on either quid pro quo or hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment.2 1 The court further held that a remand
was necessary because the district court failed to consider whether
hostile environment sexual harassment existed.2 The Supreme
Court affirmed and remanded.23
The Supreme Court, after confirming that hostile environment
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination actionable under
Title VII,2' advanced several tests to determine whether an ac-
Id. at 60-61. Vinson admitted that she willingly engaged in sexual intercourse with
Taylor; however, she claimed that she did so out of fear of losing her job. Id. at 60. Vinson
also testified that she did not report the sexual harassment or use the bank's complaint
procedure because she was afraid of Taylor. Id. at 61.
20 Id. at 61. Although the district court found that Vinson failed to prove her claim of
sexual harassment, the court nevertheless addressed the bank's liability. Id. at 62. After
recognizing that the bank had an express policy against discrimination and that this was the
first complaint recorded against Taylor, the court concluded that "the bank was without
notice and cannot be held liable for the alleged actions of Taylor." Id.
21 Id. at 62.
" Id. The court of appeals held that if the evidence demonstrated that Vinson's tolera-
tion of sexual harassment was a condition of her employment, her "voluntariness" was
immaterial with respect to her sexual harassment claim. Id. The court of appeals further
held that "an employer is absolutely liable for sexual harassment practiced by its supervi-
sory personnel, whether or not the employer knew or should have known about the mis-
conduct." Id. at 63.
2" See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 58. The Supreme Court held that "a claim of 'hostile environ-
ment' sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under Title VII,"
and that "It]he District Court's findings were insufficient to dispose of respondent's 'hostile
environment' claim." Id. at 58-59. The Court further held that the district court's determi-
nation that evidence of repondent's "sexually provocative speech and dress" was admissible
in determining whether the misconduct was unwelcome. Id. at 58. The Court additionally
held that the court of appeals erred in its conclusion that employers are automatically lia-
ble for the sexual harassment practiced by their supervisors, as Congress intended that
there be limits on the acts of employees for which employers will be held liable. Id.
2" Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73. For cases prior to Meritor that held sexual harassment may
constitute employment discrimination, see Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983)
("when Isexuall harassment pervades the workplace, or is condoned or carried out by su-
pervisory personnel, it becomes an illegal and discriminatory condition of employment that
poisons the work environment."); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11 th Cir.
1982) ("employer may not require sexual consideration from an employee as a quid pro
quo for job benefits"); Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (em-
ployer liable for Title VII violations caused by employees who act in their authorized ca-
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tionable hostile environment claim has been established.2" The
Court held that to constitute sexual harassment, the alleged mis-
conduct must be so grievous as to adversely affect the employee's
working ability and to render the employee's work environment
intolerable." The Court stipulated that the effect of the miscon-
duct on a particular employee, as well as the employee's working
atmosphere, must be assessed in determining the severity 'of the
alleged misconduct.27 Recognizing that not every reported inci-
dent would constitute an actionable Title VII claim," the Court
pacity as supervisors); Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49
(3d Cir. 1977) (Title VII violated when employer has knowledge of supervisor's sexual
advances or demands on employees); Mandia v. ARCO Chem. Co., 618 F. Supp. 1248,
1250 (D.C. Pa. 1985) ("sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited in
employment by Title VII").
"'.Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67-69; see infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing
standards advanced by Meritor).
" Id. at 67. The Court held that for a hostile environment sexual harassment claim to be
actionable, the conduct in question must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.' " Id.
(quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904); see, e.g., Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477
(5th Cir. 1989) (touching of plaintiff in sexual manner, sexual comments directed at plain-
tiff, and sexual graffiti pervading workplace raised issues of hostile environment sexual har-
assment); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1556 (1I1th Cir. 1987) (rub-
bing plaintiffs shoulders, playing with plaintiff's hair, threats and explicit sexual comments
towards plaintiff created hostile environment); Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (plaintiff made
prima facie case of sexual harassment by demonstrating that she was subjected to demean-
ing sexual inquiries and vulgarities during two years of employment with police depart-
ment); Morris v. American Nat'l Can Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1489, 1490-92 (E.D. Mo. 1989)
(explicit sexual remarks, comments, jokes, pictures, cartoons, and unwanted touching of
plaintiff's buttocks and breasts created hostile working environment), aff d in part, rev'd in
part, 952 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1991). But see Minteer v. Auger, 844 F.2d 569, 571 (8th Cir,
1988) (inconsiderable amount of unwelcome sexual remarks directed at plaintiff did not
rise to level of actionable claim outlined in Meritor); Raley v. Board of St. Mary's County
Comm'rs, 752 F. Supp. 1272, 1279 (D.C. Md. 1990) (employer may rebut plaintiff's argu-
ment by proving that harassment did not exist or was isolated or trivial).
27 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The Court concluded that conduct of a sexual nature consti-
tutes sexual harassment when "such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment." Id. See generally CONTE, supra note 7, at 28 (Meritor en-
dorsed objective test encompassed in E.E.O.C. guidelines); John R. Webb, Note, Recent
Developments in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 18 COLO. LAw. 263, 263 (1989) (Meritor
adopted E.E.O.C.'s standard that conduct must unreasonably affect work performance of
individual or create offensive work environment).
" Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; see Downes v. Federal Aviation Administration, 775 F.2d 288,
293-94 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (four separate incidents of alleged sexual harassment, including
sexual references to plaintiff, speculations as to frequency of plaintiffs sexual relationships,
and touching of plaintiffs hair, did not violate Title VII); Volk v. Coler, 638 F. Supp.
1555, 1559-60 (C.D. 11. 1986) (unwelcome advances, comments and obscene gestures di-
rected at plaintiff, and references to females as "frustrated females" or "bitches" deemed
636
Sexual Harassment
concluded that the plaintiff's claim should be analyzed according
to the circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct.2 9 The
Court also noted that the plaintiff's conduct is a proper
consideration.3
"occasional" and not actionable), rev'd, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988): Vermett v. Hough,
627 F. Supp. 587, 607 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (one act of co-worker shining flashlight through
plaintiff's legs and other parts of her body did not constitute sexual harassment). But see
King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (even
though single incident of misconduct can be enough to constitute sexual harassment claim,
repeated occurrences of harassment created more viable claim); Andrews v. City of Phila-
delphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Ferguson v. E.I. dupont de Nemours
& Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1196 (D. Del. 1983) (sexual comments and derogatory remarks
addressed to plaintiff and offensive touching created hostile work environment); Note, Sex-
ual Harassment & Title VII, 51 NY.U. L. REV. 148, 164 n. 76 (1976) (single incident of suffi-
cient severity may constitute sexual harassment).
" Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69; see Riley v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 368,
372 (7th Cir. 1989) (in assessing whether employee's release of sexual harassment claims
was valid, court made its determination from totality of circumstances): Vance v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1506-07 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (court considered all cir-
cumstances surrounding misconduct, including evidence that other employees were dis-
criminated against and supervisor's alleged refusal to provide plaintiff with necessary train-
ing): Bohen v. City of E. Chicago, Ind., 799 F.2d 1180, 1186 (7th Cir. 1986) (court must
determine whether conduct was offensive enough to constitute sexual harassment in light
of totality of circumstances): Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 294,
301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that in order for plaintiff to recover under Title VII on
sexual harassment claim, conduct must be analyzed on case-by-case basis, including all cir-
cumstances surrounding alleged misconduct); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(b) (1985). The E.E.O.C.
guidelines state:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Com-
mission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances,
such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged inci-
dents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made
from the facts, on a case by case basis.
ld.
'0 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68. The Court asserted that "[t]he gravamen of any sexual harass-
ment claim is that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' " Id.; see Swentek v. U.S.
Air, 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff must demonstrate that conduct was unwel-
come, that it was based on sex, and that it was sufficiently severe to create abusive working
environment): Moylan v. Maries County, 792 F.2d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1986) (to constitute
sexual harassment, conduct must be unwelcome in sense that employee did not solicit or
invite such conduct); Morris, 730 F. Supp. at 1495 (plaintiff's own behavior may be indica-
tive of whether or not challenged conduct was unwelcome); see also Perkins v. Silverstein,
939 F.2d 463, 467-68 (7th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff, in attempting to prove that she was sub-
jected to unwelcome advances, failed to identify any specific incidents of unwelcome harass-'
ment): Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1991) (plaintiff's sexual harassment
claim failed as court found sexually suggestive jokes and activities were not unwelcome);
Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996, 996 (8th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff's sexual harassment
claim did not succeed as court found that alleged harassment may have been invited by
plaintiff): Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (1988) (plaintiff subjected to un-
welcome sexual verbal assaults, touching, and grabbing of her body), affid in part, rev'd in
part sub nom. Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990); Perkins v. General Motors
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Although Meritor did not expressly set forth what other factors
should be considered, the authors contend that the aggressor's
knowledge of the victim's susceptibilities should be a factor in de-
termining whether the conduct constituted harassment. Since
courts consider this knowledge to be an aggravating factor in the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress,3 1 courts should
also apply this factor, by analogy, to sexual harassment claims.
B. Perspectives
While the Meritor Court advanced several tests to determine ac-
tionable misconduct, it failed to provide an appropriate perspec-
tive from which to assess such misconduct. 2 Other courts have
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1500 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (court found that plaintiff had entered
into relationship with alleged harasser and therefore "welcomed" sexual relationship), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1309 (1991); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 687 F. Supp. 848, 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (employee's sexual harassment claim failed because court found her affair
with defendant was welcomed).
The Meritor Court held that evidence of "plaintiff's provocative speech and dress" may
be admitted to demonstrate that the conduct was welcome and should be examined in light
of "the record as a whole." 477 U.S. at 69; see, e.g., Jones v. Wesco Invs., Inc., 846 F.2d
1154, 1155 n.4 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (court is required to take into account provocative speech
and dress of plaintiff in assessing sexual harassment claims); Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116
F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Utah 1987) (determination of plaintiff's sexually provocative speech
and dress is relevant in assessing whether sexual advances were welcome). See generally
Brown, supra note 2, at 442-43 (no per se bar against admitting evidence of plaintiff's
sexually provocative speech or dress); Wendy Pollack, Women's Experience vs. Legal Defini-"
tions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 55-56 (1990) (courts have adopted "rules of evaluation to
discredit women," which include use of evidence regarding woman's sexually provocative
speech and dress); Sepler, supra note 2, at 72 (sexually provocative speech and dress of
plaintiff is relevant in court's determination of whether conduct was unwelcome).
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46 (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Section
46, in pertinent part, reads "[olne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." Id.
Conduct has been held to be outrageous where the actor is found to have had knowledge
that the victim was susceptible to such emotional distress and had acted upon such knowl-
edge, Id. at cmt. f. Additionally, liability has only attached when the court has found the
conduct to have been so "outrageous" or "extreme" as to be regarded as "intolerable in a
civilized society." Id. at cmt. d.
* See E. Clayton Hipp, Jr., Now You See It, Now You Don't: The "Hostile Work Environment"
After Meritor, 28 Am. Bus. L.J. 339, 359 (1988) (Meritor left boundaries for future hostile
environment cases undefined because of unique facts of case); Peter E. Millspaugh, When
Self-Organization Includes Racial Haiassment: Must the NLRA Yield to Title VII?, 2 GEO. MASoN
U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 1, 10 (1991) (suggesting that main problem with litigating hostile environ-
ment claims is both lack of operative definition of "hostile environment" and lack of set
standard for establishing such claims); Rowe, supra note 12, at 265 (commentators disagree
as to whether vague terminology in Meritor led courts to apply specific standard in ascer-
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found it necessary to evaluate misconduct from a particular view-
point. 8 Five different perspectives have been proposed.3
1. The Objective Reasonable Person Perspective
The thrust of the objective reasonable person perspective is that
liability will attach under Title VII if a hypothetical reasonable
person finds the alleged misconduct offensive. 5 In addition to re-
ceiving considerable judicial support,3 6 the objective reasonable
taining existence of environmental sexual harassment).
'3 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (advancing perspective of vic-
tim); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (adopting rea-
sonable person of same sex standard with subjective requirement that plaintiff prove in-
jury): Yates v. Avco, 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (advancing reasonable woman
standard); Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (proposing two-
prong standard incorporating both objective reasonable person standard and subjective
viewpoint of plaintiff), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Danna v. New York Tel. & Tel.
Co., 752 F. Supp. 594, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (proposing reasonable person standard).
Commentators have differed as to the more appropriate standard. See Rowe, supra note
12, at 265 (commentators have expressed much disagreement over appropriate standard to
be used): see also Murray, supra note 15, at 464 (questioning whether conduct should be
assessed from viewpoint of reasonable employer, reasonable woman or reasonable victim,
or subjectively from position of harasser or victim); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abu-
sive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. Rv. 1449, 1458 (1984) [hereinafter
Abusive Work] (court could either adopt objective view of reasonable defendant, objective
perspective of reasonable plaintiff, subjective viewpoint of specific defendant or subjective
opinion of particular victim).
, See supra note 33 (outlining different standards adopted by courts).
" See cases cited infra note 36 (discussing objective standard).
" See Wyerick v. Bayou Steel Corp., 887 F.2d. 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1989) (conduct must
be equally offensive to both men and women); Danna, 752 F. Supp. at 611 (where evidence
leads reasonable person in similar situation to find environment hostile, liability should fol-
low under Title VII (citing Bennett v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 705 F. Supp.
979, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1989))); Tunis v. Corning Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 951, 958
(S.D.N.Y.) (conduct must be pervasive and of such nature as to interfere with work per-
formance and well-being of reasonable person), affd, 930 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1990); Caleshu
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 737 F. Supp. 1070, 1082-83 (E.D. Mo. 1990)
(court applied perspective of reasonable person in similar circumstances in determining
that conduct did not constitute sexual harassment); Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279,
288 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (workplace pervaded with offensive conduct that affects work per-
formance or well-being of reasonable person in similar circumstances is hostile); Watts v.
New York City Police Dept., 724 F. Supp. 99, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (if reasonable person in
similar circumstances would find working environment hostile enough to adversely affect
his or her well-being, cause of action has accrued); Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F.
Supp. 1481, 1501 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (using objective reasonable person standard to show
that conduct unreasonably interfered with plaintiff's work performance and created abu-
sive work environment affecting plaintiff's well-being), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 911 F.2d
22 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 1309 (1991): Hollis v. Fleetguard, Inc., 668 F.
Supp. 631, 636-37 (M.D. Tenn. 1987) (reasonable person's perspective in similar environ-
ment under like circumstances must be adopted by court to effectively protect plaintiff and
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person perspective has been endorsed by the E.E.O.C.3 7 The
E.E.O.C. proposed that courts should uniformly adopt the view-
point of a "reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment"
when evaluating misconduct. 8
defendant (citing Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620)), affd, 848 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1988): Scott v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1056 (N.D. !11. 1985) (sexual harassment deter-
mined from objective point of view with focus on conduct and not plaintiff's reaction to
such conduct), affd, 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally Murray, supra note 15, at
478 (Title VII cause of action exists when reasonably prudent person would be so offended
by conduct that person would find work conditions had changed from abuse-free to
hostile).
Courts have also applied the reasonable person standard in evaluating constructive dis-
charge claims, where the employer allegedly made the employee's work environment so
intolerable that the employee was forced into an involuntary resignation. See Cuevas v.
Monroe St. City Club Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1405, 1413 (N.D. Ill. 1990): see also Brooms v.
Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 423 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming use of reasonable person
standard by district court); Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, 860 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir.
1988) (focusing on impact of employer's conduct on reasonable employee), rev'd, 909 F.2d
747 (3d Cir. 1990); Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor, 770 F.2d 47, 50 (6th Cir. 1985) (rea-
sonableness measured from perspective of reasonable person in employee's position at time
of constructive discharge); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir.
1981) (employee's subjective view does not govern in constructive discharge claim): Phaup
v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 555, 570 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (employees may
not be overly sensitive to working atmosphere); Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 728 F. Supp.
477, 481 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (since employee's perception of situation is judged objectively,
employee may not be unreasonably sensitive to working environment), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 934 F.2d 726 (6th Cir. 1991): Ross v. Twenty-four Collection Inc., 681 F. Supp.
1547, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (noting that objective perspective must be applied in construc-
tive discharge claim), affd, 875 F.2d 873 (11 th Cir. 1989); Marley v. United Parcel Serv.
Inc., 665 F. Supp. 119, 129 (D.R.I. 1987) (inquiry focused on reasonable state of mind of
plaintiff).
In constructive discharge cases, the objective standard requires an employee to show that
the conduct complained of created working conditions that were so burdensome that a
reasonable person in the employee's position would have been compelled to resign. See
Dornhecker v. Malibu Grand Prix, 828 F.2d. 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Schafer v.
Board of Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying objective standard to construc-
tive discharge claim of male plaintiff who was denied one year paternity leave); Calhoun v.
Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1986). The Calhoun Court found that
the plaintiff's demotion from the position he held for fourteen years, exclusion from train-
ing seminars, and threats of drastic increases in working hours created constructive dis-
charge. Id. (citing Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)).
11 E.E.O.C. Policy Guidance On Current Issues Of Sexual Harassment, § C(I) (1985)
1hereinafter Policy Guidance].
Il Id. For cases supporting the E.E.O.C. standard, see Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) ("For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create
an abusive working environment.'" (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th
Cir. 1982))): see also Hirschfield v. New Mexico Dep't Corrections, 916 F.2d 572, 575 (1Oth
Cir. 1990) (same): Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 578 (2d Cir.
1989) (same). For specific examples of what type of conduct constitutes hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment, see Halasi-Schmick v. City of Shawnee, 759 F. Supp. 747, 751-52
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One of the primary goals of Title VII was to eliminate disparate
treatment in the workplace. 9 It is submitted that on the surface,
the objective reasonable person perspective appears to promote
this goal by taking into account the viewpoint of both sexes
through the use of a hypothetical person. It is suggested, how-
ever, that this perspective does not further Title VII's purpose,
because the objective reasonable person perspective, in a male-
dominated society, is no more than a guise for a reasonable man's
perspective. In reality, the objective reasonable person perspective
espouses what men consider acceptable behavior, while overshad-
owing, if not totally excluding, the perspective of women.4
(D. Kan. 1991) (three incidents of alleged offensive verbal conduct directed towards plain-
tiff did not create hostile working environment), reconsideration denied, No. 90-4045-S,
1991 WL 49736 (D. Kan. Mar. 29, 1991): Cline v. General Elec. Credit Auto Lease, 748 F.
Supp. 650, 655 (N.D. III. 1990) (occasional sexual remarks would not unreasonably inter-
fere with work performance of average employee); Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, 633
F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (vulgar language, sexual jokes, and discussions about
sex did not create hostile environment since plaintiff welcomed such conduct), affd, 824
F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988). But see Broderick v. Ruder,
685 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D.D.C. 1988) (sexual harassment existing in workplace was so
pervasive that hostile environment was created); Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp.
780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (plaintiff subjected to offensive language and abusive drawings
constituted sexual harassment).
"o See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). In aiming to control inequality in the workplace, §
2000e-2(a)(2) prohibits the following:
It shall be unlawful ... for an employer ...to limit, segregate, or classify his em-
ployees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin ....
ld.: Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court rejected the view that Title VII was lim-
ited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. Id. Instead, the Court held that the lan-
guage of Title VII "evinces a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and women in employment." Id.; see also Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.) ("Congress intended to strike at entire spec-
trum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Tunis, 747 F. Supp. at 958 (same); cf Andrews v. City of Phila-
delphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Congress designed Title VII to prevent the
perpetuation of stereotypes and a sense of degradation which serve to close or discourage
employment opportunities for women.")
"0 See, e.g., Robinson v. Lindsay, 598 P.2d 392, 393 (Wash. 1979). Initially, courts as-
sessed conduct according to what a "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would consider
unreasonable. Id.: see Osborn v. Montgomery, 234 N.W. 372, 377 (Wis. 193 1) (reasonable
and intelligent man must find risk unreasonable); Freeman v. Adams, 218 P. 600, 603-04
(Cal. Ct. App. 1923) (utilizing "reasonable and prudent man of the law" standard); see also
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987) (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith warned that if the reasonable woman standard
was not adopted, conduct would continue to be measured against what men considered to
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2. Objective-Subjective Perspective
A second perspective courts have followed is an objective-sub-
jective perspective promulgated by the Sixth Circuit in Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co.4' In Rabidue, a female employee brought an
action after her discharge, alleging sex discrimination and sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the
Elliot-Larsen Act under Michigan state law.42 In analyzing the al-
leged misconduct, the court incorporated.an objective and subjec-
tive perspective into a two-tier test, requiring the plaintiff to
prove that a reasonable person would have been affected by the
conduct, and that the plaintiff was actually offended by the con-
duct and sustained some degree of injury therefrom.43 In formu-
lating this two-tier test, the Rabidue court reasoned that the objec-
constitute sexual harassment. Id.; RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 291. Section 291 pro-
vides: "where an act is one which a reasonable man could recognize as invoking a risk of
harm to another, the risk is unreasonable. ... Id. But see W. PROSSER. J WADE. & V.
SCHWA~rZ. CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 150 n.3 (1988) (masculine form of reasonable
person is outdated, and proper test to be used is "reasonable, prudent person").
4' 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
"Id. at 611-12.
Id. at 620: see, e.g., King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th
Cir. 1990) (harassment assessed from both objective and subjective viewpoint of plaintiff);
see Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (subjecting plaintiff to
offensive racial and sexual remarks, as well as photographs displaying acts of interracial
sodomy, would detrimentally affect reasonable person in similar circumstances): Paroline v.
Unysis Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (1989) (unwanted touching and sexual innuendos culmi-
nating in sexual battery met both objective and subjective requirements of Rabidue), vacated
in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990); Guiden v. South Eastern Pub. Serv. Auth. of Va., 760
F. Supp. 1171, 1178 (E.D. Va. 1991) (court concluded that four separate sexual comments
made by defendant to plaintiff presented colorable environmental sexual harassment
claim): Wall v. AT & T Tech., 754 F. Supp. 1084, 1095 (M.D.N.C. 1990) (lewd gestures,
comments made about plaintiff's breasts, and invitations to engage in sexual relations cre-
ated material question of fact whether Title VII was violated), appeal dismissed, 931 F.2d
888 (4th. Cir. 1991); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 218-19 (E.D. Va.
1988) (unwanted sexual advances, propositions, and derogatory and degrading comments
made about women established hostile work environment claim), affd, 894 F.2d 651 (4th
Cir. 1990); Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261, 271 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (super-
visor's asking plaintiff to lift up her dress, asking if she "fooled around", and asking her to
"pant heavily" on phone established pattern of sexual harassment sufficient to create hos-
tile environment). But see Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 192-93 (1st
Cir. 1990) (co-worker intentionally bumping into plaintiff, "peeping" at plaintiff while in
restroom, and asking plaintiff to dance at hospital party would not affect reasonable per-
son's psychological well-being); see also Lisa Rhode, The Sixth Circuit's Double Standard in
Hostile Work Environment Claims: Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir.
1988), 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 789 (1989) (once plaintiff proved that reasonable person
would be adversely affected by misconduct, plaintiff had additional burden of proving she
was offended and suffered injury).
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tive-subjective perspective affords protection to both plaintiff and
defendant. 44 Theoretically, the plaintiff is sheltered from decisions
based on stereotypical notions of sexual harassment, since the spe-
cific claim is evaluated according to the plaintiff's personality and
current work environment."' Likewise, the defendant is safe-
guarded against the hypersensitive plaintiff, since the plaintiff is
required to prove that the conduct would have interfered with a
reasonable person's working ability and well-being.
46
The authors contend that the objective-subjective perspective,
like the objective reasonable person perspective, fails to promote
Title VII's goal of regulating sex discrimination because it assesses
misconduct according to what a reasonable person in a male-domi-
nated society would consider unacceptable, thereby preserving the
status quo. The authors further contend that this perspective fails
due to its requirement that plaintiff prove injury to recover. By
requiring proof of injury, a plaintiff who has been sexually
harassed, but has not suffered a tangible injury, will have to en-
dure the abusive work environment until a constructive discharge,
retaliatory discharge, or physical injury occurs. In contrast to the
41 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; see Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487,
1500-01 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (adopting viewpoint of reasonable person enables court to pro-
vide protection to plaintiffs and defendants): Blesedell v. Mobil Oil Co., 708 F. Supp. 1408,
1418 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (same): Hollis v. Fleetguard, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 631, 637 (M.D. Ten.
1987) (same), affid, 848 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1988). See generally Rowe, supra note 12, at 263
(use of both objective and subjective standards supports both parties).
41 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. The court asserted that "the presence of an actionable sex-
ual harassment claim would be different depending upon the personality of the plaintiff
and the prevailing work environment, and must be considered and evaluated upon an ad-
hoc basis." Id.; see also Morgan, 712 F. Supp. at 257 (presence of actionable sexual harass-
ment claim depends upon plaintiffs personality and current work atmosphere and must be
considered on case by case basis); Policy Guidance, supra note 37, § C(I) (reasonable person
standard should embrace perspective of victim and not stereotypical beliefs as to what con-
stitutes acceptable behavior). See generally Roland Turner, Employer Liability Under Title VII
for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment By Supervisory Personnel: The Impact and Aftermath
of Meritor Savings Bank, 33 How LJ. 1, 14 (1990) (hostile environment sexual harassment
must be assessed on ad hoc basis and requires examination of plaintiff's disposition and
general work environment).
" See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620; see also Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264,
1271 (7th Cir. 1991) (reasonable person standard places "check on claims for relief by the
supersensitive 'eggshell' plaintiff'); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483
(3d Cir. 1990) (objective standard serves to protect employer against overly sensitive plain-
tiff): Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984). The Zabkowicz
court noted the requirement that the alleged harassment be unreasonable ensures that Ti-
tle VII will not serve as a means for hypersensitive plaintiffs to litigate every insult. Id.
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Sixth Circuit in Rabidue, several courts have held that neither eco-
nomic nor physical injury is required to establish a hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claim.47 The requirement of injury,
therefore, defeats Title VII's objective: creating a working envi-
ronment free from sexual discrimination.48
3. The Objective Reasonable Woman Perspective
The third viewpoint that courts have adopted is the objective
reasonable woman perspective proposed by Judge Keith in his dis-
senting opinion in Rabidue.49 Judge Keith's main concern with the
" See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB, v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). The Meritor Court
held that under Title VII, a plaintiff is not required to demonstrate economic injury in
order to establish a hostile environment sexual harassment claim. Id. The Court further
held that for a claim to be actionable, the conduct must be "sufficiently severe or pervasive
'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment.' " Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1982)); see
also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (employees need not tolerate sex-
ual harassment until they suffer "anxiety or debilitation"); Wall, 754 F. Supp. at 1095
(when employee is forced to endure hostile environment or leave employment, Title VII
claim has been established); Double Diamond, 672 F. Supp. at 271 (suggesting that it would
be inconsistent to maintain that individual does not have Title VII claim if harassment had
not occurred for specified amount of time). But see Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. In Rabidue,
the majority stated that absent "conduct which would ... affect seriously the psychological
well-being of' [a] reasonable person ... a plaintiff may not prevail on asserted charges of
sexual harassment anchored in an alleged hostile and/or abusive work environment re-
gardless of whether the plaintiff was actually offended by defendant's conduct."
48 See Policy Guidance, supra note 37, § C(3). One of Title VII's purposes is to prevent
sexual harassment from contaminating the work environment of those classes of individuals
protected under the Civil Rights Act. Id.; see also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (holding that
"Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult"); Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Title VII protects employee's right to work in atmosphere free from sexual harassment);
Newsday, Inc., v. Long Island Typographical Union no. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir.
1990) (same), cert. denied, I llS. Ct. 1314 (1991); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1437 (7th
Cir. 1988) (same). But see Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (Title VII not meant to change work
environments where "sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound," nor was it designed to produce "magical transformation in the social mores of
American workers"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1525
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (same).
49 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith concluded that the relevant in-
quiry with respect to hostile environment sexual harassment claims was whether the al-
leged misconduct was offensive to a reasonable woman. Id. at 627. Judge Keith further
asserted that "unless the outlook of a reasonable woman is adopted, the defendants as well
as the courts are permitted to sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned
by offenders .... ." Id. at 626. Judge Keith stated that "I would have courts adopt the
perspective of the reasonable victim .... " Id. (citing Abusive Work, supra note 33, at 1459).
The reasonable victim standard is equivalent to the objective reasonable woman standard,
since the "[cioncern for the dignity of women would require courts to determine the
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objective-subjective perspective applied by the majority was that it
incorporated an objective reasonable person perspective which
failed to consider the difference between what men and women
perceive to be acceptable behavior." Conduct that men might
consider normal, good-natured socializing might be seen as en-
tirely offensive and intolerable by women.5 1 The objective reason-
able woman standard acknowledges this disparity by allowing
courts to consider these differences while concurrently shielding
employers from unfounded claims made by a hypersensitive em-
ployee."2 By assessing conduct according to what a reasonable wo-
man would consider objectionable, it is suggested that the objec-
tive reasonable woman perspective attempts to ensure that a
woman's perspective on what constitutes sexual harassment would
be incorporated into the law. The authors further suggest, how-
wrongfulness of conduct from the standpoint of the victim." Id.: see also Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (perspective of reasonable woman should be used
since standard requires plaintiff to be member of protected class, and by definition women
are protected class): Austen v. State of Hawaii, 759 F. Supp 612, 628 (D. Haw. 1991) (rea-
sonable woman would find defendant's references to plaintiff typical of male who considers
females inferior): Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (D.P.R. 1987) (conduct
assessed according to objective standard of what reasonable woman's reaction to similar
environment would be, not on what particular plaintiff finds offensive), rev'd, 864 F.2d 881
(Ist Cir. 1988); Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y.
1987) (concluding that conduct was such that reasonable woman in plaintiffs position
would have found it intolerable).
"0 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith indicated that "the rea-
sonable person standard fails to account for the wide divergence between most women's
views of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men." Id.
51 See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (conduct men consider
unobjectionable may affront women); Yates, 819 F.2d at 637 n.2 (acknowledging that men
and women are offended by different types of behavior); see also Lipsett v. University of
P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (male supervisor may consider his comments to
female subordinate about her figure or body unoffensive). See generally Nancy S.
Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Har-
assment Law, 99 YA.F. L.J. 1177, 1207 (1990) (men view sexual harassment as "harmless
social interaction to which only overly-sensitive women would object"); Matthews, supra
note 2, at 313 (conduct objectionable to plaintiff may be permissible behavior to defend-
ant): Shannon Murphy, Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: What Makes a Work Environ-
ment "Hostile?", 40 ARK. L. REv. 857, 867-68 (1987) (conduct offensive to women consid-
ered harmless or innocent by men).
52 See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626 (Keith, J., dissenting) (commenting that courts should
employ "perspective of reasonable victim, which simultaneously allows courts to consider
salient sociological differences as well as shield employers from the neurotic complainant"
(citing Abusive Work, supra note 33, at 1459)): see also Ehrenreich, supra note 51, at 1217
(Judge Keith suggested that "jthel doctrinal construct itself will determine whether a par-
ticular woman's complaint is legitimate").
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ever, that as the objective reasonable person perspective and the
objective-subjective perspective tip the scale in favor of men when
a woman alleges harassment, the objective reasonable woman per-
spective reverses this imbalance against men, when sexual harass-
ment claims are brought by men.
4. Reasonable Person of Plaintiff's Sex Perspective
A fourth viewpoint advanced by the courts is the reasonable
person of the plaintiff's sex perspective."3 Under this perspective,
courts analyze conduct according to what a reasonable person of
the plaintiff's sex would perceive as abusive, and whether plaintiff
was "as affected" as a reasonable person in a similar environ-
ment. "' The authors submit that this perspective eliminates the
imbalance created by both the objective reasonable person and
the objective reasonable woman persepectives by assessing con-
duct according to what a reasonable person of plaintiff's sex
would consider unacceptable. It is asserted, however, that because
this perspective, as utilized by the courts, requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate actual injury, it fails to promote Title VII's goal of
allowing a complainant to recover without having to prove injury.
5. Reasonable Victim Perspective
A fifth viewpoint, known as the reasonable victim perspective,
" See, e.g., Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 862 (3d Cir. 1990) (sup-
porting reasonable person of same sex perspective); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895
F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); Garvey v. Dickinson College, 761 F. Supp. 1175,
1184 (same), mQdified, 763 F. Supp. 796 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (same).
' See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482. The Andrews court held that plaintiff, to establish a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII, had to demonstrate that
"the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that
position." Id.: see also Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 862 (plaintiff must prove alleged misconduct
created "sexually charged environment and that she suffered discrimination because of en-
vironment"); Garvey, 761 F. Supp. at 1185 (discrimination must adversely affect reasonable
person of same sex in like environment); Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524 (under reasonable
person of same sex perspective, hostile environment sexual harassment claim is assessed
objectively and subjectively); cf. Daniels v. Essex, 937 F.2d 1264, 1271-72 (7th Cir. 1991).
The Daniels Court noted that an objective and subjective perspective must be applied when
evaluating racial or sexual harassment claims, including the effect of misconduct on a rea-
sonable person's working ability and well-being and the personal effect on plaintiff. Id. (cit-
ing Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (9th Cir. 1989)).
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was proposed by the Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady. 5 Under this
perspective, the court assessed conduct according to what a rea-
sonable victim would consider offensive.5 6 In rejecting a subjective
element, the Ellison court concluded that a proper hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim could be made without proving ac-
tual injury." It is suggested that this viewpoint properly evaluates
conduct in light of Title VII because it not only analyzes conduct
from the perspective of the victim, but also allows the victim to
65 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). In support of the reasonable victim perspective, the
Ellison court stated that by "not trivializing the effects of sexual harassment on reasonable
women, courts can work towards ensuring that neither men nor women will have to 'run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a
living.'" Id. at 879-80 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir.
1982)).
" See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. The court held that a female victim establishes a prima
facie hostile environment sexual harassment claim "when she alleges conduct which a rea-
sonable women would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment." Id. Conversely, the court stipu-
lated that "the appropriate victim's perspective would be that of a reasonable man" when a
male employee alleges hostile environment sexual harassment. Id. at 879 n. 11; see also
Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 861 n.15 (hostile environmental sexual harassment cases based on
theory that "[wiomen's sexuality largely defines women as women in this society, so viola-
tions of it are abuses of women as women" (quoting WORKING WOMEN, supra note 13, at
174)); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 n.2 (6th Cir. 1987) (if sexual harassment
claim is brought by male employee, "reasonable male standard" would be employed).
s' See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. The Ellison court asserted that the Meritor Court's im-
plicit adoption of the E.E.O.C.'s reasonableness test confirms that conduct may constitute
sexual harassment without causing debilitation or seriously affecting an employee's psycho-
logical well-being, as long as the conduct was unreasonable. Id. at 878. This is further
evidenced by the accepted notion that an environmental sexual harassment claim may be
brought by a plaintiff who was not personally subjected to the alleged harassment. Id.;
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (women who had never been target
of sexually disparaging conduct, but were forced to work in atmosphere impregnated with
such conduct, may have proper Title VII claim), affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); see also Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 862
(evidence of sufficiently oppressive environment could create inference that intentional dis-
crimination existed in environment); Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468,
477 (5th Cir. 1989) (sexually explicit graffiti on walls, in elevator and bathrooms, relevant
to plaintiffs Title VII claim even though not directed at plaintiff); Sims v. Montgomery
County Comm'n, 766 F. Supp. 1052, 1074 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (harassment existing in plain-
tiff's workplace was offensive not only to women it was directed at, but also to all female
employees in department); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 219 (E.D. Va.
1988) ("sexual horseplay, standing alone, is sufficient to establish a hostile [working] envi-
ronment"), aff'd, 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269,
1278 (D.D.C. 1988) (plaintiff forced to work in environment where managers harassed all
female employees); cf Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 737 F. Supp. 549, 554 (D. Haw.
1990) ("Even if plaintiff herself was never the object of racial harassment, she might none-
theless have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such
harassment was pervasive."), af'd, 936 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1991).
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recover without proving injury.
The authors submit that the first four perspectives outlined
above fail to properly evaluate conduct in light of Title VII's aim
to eliminate sex discrimination in the workplace. It is further sub-
mitted that these perspectives fail because they either do not ac-
count for existing differences between the sexes or they include a
subjective element of injury that erects an improper barrier to es-
tablishing proper Title VII claims, or both. The objective reason-
able person perspective, for example, has been criticized for fail-
ing to reflect the differences between male and female views on
acceptable behavior.5 8 The subjective requirement that plaintiff
demonstrate injury, incorporated by the objective reasonable per-
son perspective, objective-subjective perspective and the reasona-
ble person of plaintiff's sex perspective, thwarts the purpose of Ti-
tle VII, which was to allow claims of harassment without
demonstrating injury."9 It is suggested that the reasonable victim
perspective, which not only accounts for the differences existing
between men and women, but also excludes the requirement of
injury, should be used in evaluating conduct. It is further sug-
gested that courts, in utilizing this perspective, would be able to
ascertain what reasonable women consider objectionable and what
reasonable men deem offensive, and apply the appropriate per-
spective according to the sex of the victim.
C. Evaluating Perspectives in an Abuse-Free Environment
Notwithstanding which perspective is employed, courts evaluate
See supra notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text (addressing why Rabidue dissent re-jected objective reasonable person perspective, and proposing that men and women do not
interpret conduct in same way). see also Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879. The Ellison court stated
that if it were only to examine the alleged misconduct from an objective viewpoint, it
would "run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination." Id. at 878. The
court commented that its reason for adopting the objective reasonable woman perspective
was because the "sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends
to systematically ignore the experiences of women." Id. at 879: Matthews, supra note 2, at
313 (reasonable person standard does not acknowledge that sexual harassment may be
"carried out through behavior widely perceived as socially acceptable"); Rowe, supra note
12, at 271 (standards embracing objective elements create "steep hurdle" for plaintiffs to
overcome in establishing sexual harassment claims).
"' See supra notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text (addressing the problem in making
injury a requisite in establishing hostile environment sexual harassment claim).
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conduct according to the amount of offensive conduct that al-
ready exists in the workplace.60 The courts, in line with Meritor's
requirement of grievousness, 61 have considered a certain amount
of sexual harassment acceptable in ascertaining whether the con-
duct was severe enough to be singled out as abnormal for that
environment.6 Title VII, however, aspired to evaluate conduct in
an abuse-free atmosphere, not in an environment pervaded with
the very discrimination it intended to eliminate. 3 It is submitted
that the most effective way for courts to regulate sexual harass-
ment is to analyze conduct not only from the perspective of the
reasonable victim, but also against a backdrop that is free of sex-
ual harassment. It is further submitted that courts would be able
to uniformly ascertain what consitutes sexual harassment accord-
ing to what the reasonable victim considers unacceptable under
the respective cirumstances. Although this perspective may label
conduct not intended to be offensive as unlawful sexual harass-
ment, the alleged harasser's intent is not a defense in Title VII
60 See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (trier of fact must
adopt "perspective of a reasonable person's reaction to a similar environment under essen-
tially like or similar circumstances" in ascertaining whether conduct rises to level of action-
able Title VII claim); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1524
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (plaintiff must prove she was "at least as affected as the reasonable person
under like circumstances"); Danna v. New York Tel. Co., 752 F. Supp. 594, 610 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (where "evidence leads a reasonable person in a similar situation to find the environ-
ment offensive, then liability should attach under Title VII" (citing Bennett v. New York
City Dep't of Corrections, 705 F. Supp. 979, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)); Lipsett v. Rive-Mora,
669 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (D.P.R. 1987) (conduct must be objectively assessed according to
standard of what "reasonable woman's reaction to a similar environment would be"); see
also Policy Guidance, supra note 37 (standard should employ reasonable person's reaction
to similar environment).
o' See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing Meritor Court's grievousness
standard).
"l See Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620. To determine whether the environment gave rise to a
sexual harassment claim, the court found it necessary to consider the "lexicon of obscenity
that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff's intro-
duction into its environs . I.. ." d.; see also Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264,
1274 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1525 (same); Sanchez v. City of
Miami Beach, 720 F. Supp. 974, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (police officers' display of pictures,
posters and pinups "indicates the lexicon of sexual discrimination currently pervading City
of Miami Beach Police Department"). But see Barbetta v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 669 F.
Supp. 569, 572 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (casual comments and accidental or sporadic conversa-
tions insufficient to prove sexual harassment).
" See generally Rowe, supra note 12, at 272. "[The] court should have adopted the per-
spective of the individual working in the environment that Title VII aspires to create; an
environment in which there is no discrimination based on gender." Id.
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cases.
6 4
The authors assert that regardless of the perspective adopted,
whenever a hypothetical perspective is used by the courts a prob-
lem of implementation arises. For example, how does a jury com-
posed of both men and women apply a reasonable woman per-
spective or a reasonable man perspective? How does a male judge
set aside his own perceptions, as a male, over a case where a rea-
sonable woman standard is applied, or vice versa? It is suggested
that implementation would require the use of concrete evidence
such as statistical polls of the general public and experts to ascer-
tain what a reasonable woman or reasonable man would consider
sexual harassment. Although this Note sets forth what perspective
should be utilized, it is up to the courts to implement it.6 Further,
once sexual harassment is found to exist, several issues exist re-
garding an employer's liability for the acts of its employees.6"
II. EMPLOYER LIABILITY AND THE NOTICE PEQUIREMENT
Before the E.E.O.C. was created, an employer had to be on no-
tice of a supervisor's sexual harassment in order for liability to
attach.67 Most courts, however, allowed recovery even if the em-
See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ellison court maintained
that the reasonable victim standard classifies conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even if
the harasser did not understand that his or her behavior was offensive. Id. The court fur-
ther stated that although certain comments may not be intentionally abusive, motive is
irrelevant since "Title VII is not a fault-based tort scheme." Id., see also Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (lack of discriminatory intent does not justify unlaw-
ful employment practices); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[T~he
thrust of Title VII's proscriptions is aimed at the consequences or effects of an employ-
ment practice and not at the employer's motivation."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). See
generally CLAIRE S. THOMAS. SEX DISCRIMINATION IN A NUTSHELL 240 (2d ed. 1991) (under
Title VII, conduct may constitute environmental sexual harassment even though harassers
do not realize that their conduct is offensive).
'" See, e.g., New York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 1 (1973) (sample jury charges,
including instructions on how to use evidence). The judge implements the reasonable per-
son standard of care in negligence cases. Id. §2:10.
"e See infra notes 67-99 and accompanying text (discussing employers' liability).
" See Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977).
The Tomkins court held that "Title VII is violated when a supervisor, with the actual or
constructive knowledge of the employer, makes sexual advances or demands toward a
subordinate employee and conditions that employee's job ...on a favorable response to
those advances or demands." Id. However, liability would not be imposed if the employer
took "prompt and appropriate remedial action after acquiring such knowledge." Id.; see
also Garber v. Saxon Business Prods. Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (same):
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 218 (1958) [hereinafter AGENCYJ. Section 218 reads:
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ployer only had constructive knowledge of the abusive conduct.6 8
Additionally, the employer was deemed to have constructive
knowledge if the sexual harassment was persistent. 09
The E.E.O.C. has interpreted Title VII as holding employers
strictly liable for the acts of their supervisors, and has stated that
an employer is liable for a supervisor's sexual harassment regard-
less of knowledge. While courts have applied strict liability in
"Upon ratification, a purported master or other principal becomes subject to liability for
injuries caused by the tortious act of one acting or purporting to act as his agent as if the
act had been authorized, if there has been no loss of capacity by the principal." Id.
" See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983) (must show employer had
actual or constructive knowledge of existence of sexually hostile working environment and
took no prompt remedial action); Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (1 1th Cir. 1982)
(must be shown that employer knew or should have known of harassment): Bundy v. Jack-
son 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (lack of notice relieves employer of liability, but if
employer's agent has knowledge, it is imputed under agency principles). But see Bohen v.
City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 1986) (refusing to follow Katz
decision).
6O See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986). The Hunter
court held that an employer "is unlikely to know or have reason to know of casual, iso-
lated, and infrequent slurs; it is only when they are so egregious, numerous, and concen-
trated as to add up to a campaign of harassment that the employer will be culpable for
failing to . . . take remedial steps." Id.; see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 (pervasive harass-
ment gives rise to constructive knowledge); Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir.
1981) (pervasive harassment inferred employer's knowledge).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(c) (1987). The E.E.O.C. guidelines state as follows:
Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment agency, joint ap-
prenticeship committee or labor organization [hereinafter referred to as "em-
ployer"I is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees
with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained
of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether
the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence. The Commission will
examine the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the job
functions performed by the individual in determining whether an individual acts in
either a supervisory or agency capacity.
Id.
Some courts have interpreted the E.E.O.C.'s guidelines to suggest strict liability in sexual
harassment cases. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985)
(strict liability imposed upon employers for sexual harassment by supervisors under
E.E.O.C.'s rules); Ross v. Double Diamond, 672 F. Supp 261, 274 (N.D. Tx. 1987) (same).
But see Marshall v. Nelson Elec., 766 F. Supp. 1018, 1039 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (liability not
imputed upon employer for harassment by foreman).
"' See infra note 98 and accompanying text (illustrating E.E.O.C. Guidelines): see also
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated:
"[ A In employer . . . is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of
whether the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence."
Id. For other courts which have adopted this statement, see Collins v. City of San Diego,
841 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1988); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554,
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quid pro quo cases, they have been reluctant to do so in hostile
environment cases.
7 2
A. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment and Employer Liability
In quid pro quo sexual harassment, employer liability has been
imposed when an employer, or an agent of the employer, makes a
job benefit contingent on the sexual favors of an employee.7 The
employer is responsible for his supervisor's conduct because the
supervisor acts on behalf of the employer.7 4 Most courts, however,
allow the employer to avoid liability if remedial action is promptly
taken to alleviate the harassment.7 5 Interestingly, it would seem
impossible for a co-employee to create a quid pro quo working
environment, since he does not have the power to change the con-
1560 (1 lth Cir. 1987); Horn, 755 F.2d at 604.
7 See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding Inc., 867 F.2d 1131, 1316 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
("Strict liability is illogical in a pure hostile environment setting."); Hicks v. Gates Rubber
Co. 833 F.2d 1406, 1417 (1987) (finding strict liability inappropriate in hostile environ-
ment case), affd, 928 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1991).
13 See, e.g., Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316 (supervisor acts as company in quid pro quo sexual
harassment cases, thereby creating employer liability); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1436
(7th Cir. 1988) (strict liability is imposed for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel
with authority to fire and hire). But see Hirschfield v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916
F.2d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1990). The Hirschfield court found that sexual harassment is not
within the scope of employment since it "simply is not within the job description of any
supervisor or any other worker in any reputable business." Id. Thus, one must look to
other areas of agency law to impose liability. Id.
7' See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir. 1986). The Hunter
court held that when "someone at the decision-making level in the corporate hierarchy has
committed [a] wrong the deliberate act of such a person is the corporation's deliberate act .
. This is true regardless of his superiors' knowledge." Id.
71 See Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 1989) (employer
may escape liability by taking remedial action unless "the plaintiff can establish that the
employer's response was not reasonably calculated to halt the harassment"); Yates v. Avco
Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 635 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that employer may escape liability
through remedial action, but nonfunctional policy against sexual harassment will not shield
employer): Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (employer liable
for quid pro quo sexual harassment unless he took remedial action); Tomkins v. Public
Serv. Elect. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048 (3d Cir. 1977) (employer may escape liability
if prompt appropriate remedial action is taken after acquiring knowledge of sexual harass-
ment): But see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 n.19 (1 th Cir. 1982). The
Henson court rejected the argument advanced in Tomkins allowing an employer to escape
responsibility for sexual harassment by taking later remedial action. Id. The court further
found that remedial action may mitigate damages, but does not effect employer liability.
Id.; see also Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658-59 (4th Cir. 1990). The court
held that to prove a prima face case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, a plaintiff must




ditions of the victim's employment. 76
B. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and Employer Liability
In a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, a supervisor
acts without the actual or apparent authority of his employer,
thereby making it difficult to hold the employer strictly liable.7
The Supreme Court, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, ad-
dressed the problem of hostile environment employer liability.78
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, did not furnish a defini-
tive rule regarding employer liability for a supervisor's hostile en-
vironment harassment, but maintained that such a rule should be
drawn from common law agency principles. 79 The Court, how-
ever, rejected automatic employer liability, as well as the lower
court's assertion that lack of notice would shield the employer in
all cases.80 In addition, the Court dismissed the idea that the exis-
tence of a company policy against discrimination alone could insu-
late the employer from liability.8" Justice Marshall, in his concur-
7' See Henson, 682 F.2d at 909. The Henson court held that. the power of changing a
condition of employment, such as the authority to fire, when misused, attaches employer
liability. Id.; Janet Hugie Smith & Curt A. Hawes, Update: Sexual Harassment in the Work-
place, in ALI-ABA RESOURCE MATERIAlS: LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW 825-34 (5th ed. 1990
& Supp. 1991) (quid pro quo sexual harassment exists when '[the] submission to or rejec-
tion of [sexual advances] by an individual is used as a basis for employment decisions").
' See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 1989)
(strict liability inappropriate in pure hostile environment setting): Marshall v. Nelson Elec.,
766 F. Supp 1018, 1039 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (interpreting Meritor's rejection of strict liability
in hostile environment claim); Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, 746 F. Supp.
798, 802 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (same), affd, 957 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992). See generally BARABARA
SCHI.EI & PAUL GROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 423-24 (2d ed. 1983) (trend
against strict liability in hostile environment sexual harassment cases through 1983).
'a 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See generally supra, notes 17-22 and accompanying text (discussing
Meritor).
" Meritor, 477 U.S. at 70. Justice Rehnquist stated that the Court "agreeld] with the
E.E.O.C. that Congress wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in this
area." Id. He noted that "such common-law principles may not be transferable in all their
particulars to Title VII" but found that Congress had decided to define employer to in-
clude any agent of an employer within 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b). Id. See generally RESTATEMENT,
supra note 31, §§ 219-237 (defining employer so as to include agents).
80 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72. The Meritor Court noted that Congress had "intendled] to
place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be
held responsible." Id.
", Id. The Court held that policies against sexual harassment were clearly relevant, but
not essentially dispositive. Id. This holding was based on the fact that the employer's policy
against harassment did not function properly. Id.
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rence, stated that an employer would be liable for sexual
harassment committed by employees if the employer or his agents
knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to
take appropriate corrective action.82
Following Meritor, circuit courts were divided over the issue of
notice as a requirement of employer liability in a hostile environ-
ment claim."3 It is suggested that a bifurcated approach would
best resolve the notice requirement in a hostile environment
claim: the first level would deal with liability for a supervisor's sex-
ual harassment, and the second level would concentrate on co-em-
ployee sexual harassment.
At the first level, where the perpetrator is a supervisor, liability
should be directly imputed to the employer regardless of actual
knowledge, because a supervisor, through the grant of authority,
is able to act for, and in place of, the employer-principal.8 4 How-
" Id. at 2409 (Marshall, J., concurring). The guidelines state that "with respect to con-
duct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment..
. where the employer knows [of it] . . . unless it can show it took immediate... action." Id.
(quoting 29 C.FR. § 1604.11 (c) & (d) (1985)).
8* See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc. 867 F.2d 1311, 1317 (1 1th Cir. 1989)
(employer knew of supervisor engaged in sexually oriented joking with employees, but was
not found liable because prompt remedial action was taken); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630, 631 (6th Cir. 1987) (employer liability found when female employees were sexually
harassed by supervisor, because conduct was foreseeable, regardless of actual notice):
Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir. 1986) (when upper level
employee acts, it is as if employer itself acts; therefore knowledge is irrelevant and strict
liability imposed).
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated that "an em-
ployer is liable if a supervisor or an agent violates Title VII, regardless of knowledge or
any other mitigating factor." Id.; see, e.g., Hirschfield v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't,
916 F.2d 572, 577-78 (10th Cir. 1990). An employer will be liable under agency principles
for a supervisor's act within the scope of employment or a supervisor's act outside the
scope of employment if there is reasonable reliance on apparent authority or the employer
is negligent in hiring. Id.; Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1436 (7th Cir. 1988) (strict liabil-
ity imposed on employer for sexual harassment by supervisory personnel who have power
to hire, fire or promote); Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d 900, 904
(1 th Cir. 1988) (employer found to be directly liable for sexual harassment by supervisor
through agency principles): Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1558
(1 ith Cir. 1987) (conduct of supervisor who acts as agent is deemed to be conduct of his
employer). But see Steele, 867 F.2d at 1316 (holdings in Sparks and Huddleston applied only
to cases of hostile environment coupled with quid pro quo sexual harassment): see also Elli-
son v. Nicholas, 924 F.2d 872, 872 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ellison court held that liability will
be imposed on the employer if a manager had knowledge of the tort. Id. Since supervisor is
always aware of his own misbehavior, the employer will be responsible for administrators'
exploits. Id., cf. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 1991) (knowledge
of sexual misconduct of supervisor personnel is imputed to employer): Huddleston, 845
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ever, this standard applies only when the supervisor acts within
the scope of his employment. 85 Although some courts have found
that sexual harassment is never within the scope of employment,
supervisors, by virtue of their positions of power, are able to in-
timidate employees and force them to endure offensive conduct.8
F.2d at 904 (constructive knowledge does not have to be proven for supervisor who had
actual and apparent authority to alter plaintiff's employment status); Yates, 819 F.2d at 636
(knowledge of sexual wrongdoing by supervisor is imputed to employer when employee
acts within scope of employment); Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1421 (upper level employees act as
employer, therefore knowledge requirements become irrelevant and strict liability is im-
posed); Shrout v. The Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 781 (S.D. Oh. 1988) (same);
AGENCY, supra note 67, § 219. Section 219 states:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting
in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relation.
Id.
6 See, e.g., Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir.
1990) (liability is found through negligence when sexual harassment is outside scope of
employment); Steele, 867 F.2d at 1315 (employer not liable for supervisor's conduct be-
cause acts were outside scope of employment, absent reliance on actual or apparent author-
ity); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F,2d 1406, 1417-18 (1987) (sexual. mistreatment is
never within scope of employment unless employer allowed supervisor to sexually assault
employee or supervisor had apparent authority which aided tort), aff d, 928 F.2d 966 (10th
Cir. 1991): Turner, supra note 45, at 45 (tort within scope of employment when completed
through supervisory authority and therefore liability should be levied upon employer).
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines the scope of employment as follows:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform:
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits:
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is
not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in
kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too
little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
Id. § 218.
" See, e.g., Steele, 867 F.2d at 1315. The Steele court held that the creation of a hostile
environment is not within the scope of a supervisor's employment. Id. Since sexual harass-
ment is never within any job description, the courts may find an employer liable if he was
either negligent or reckless. Id.; see Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1417. Liability may also be imposed
if the supervisor purported to act on behalf of the employer and there was reliance on the
apparent authority, which in turn aids the tort. Id. The Hicks court found that "confining
liability to situations in which a supervisor acted within the scope of his authority conceiva-
bly could lead to the ludicrous result that employers would become accountable only if
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A broad interpretation of a supervisor's scope of employment is
not only necessary to hold the employer liable for sexual harass-
ment perpetrated by a supervisor,87 but also to abolish attitudes
which result in the degradation of women in the workplace.8 Im-
plementing automatic liability is fair because it is foreseeable that
if the employer is not careful in the hiring of supervisors, sexual
harassment may occur.89 It is suggested that there should be an
they explicitly require or consciously allow their supervisors to molest women employees."
Id. (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985), affid in part, rev'd in part
sub nom. Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). But see Anne C. Levy, The Change in
Employer Liability for Supervisor Sexual Harassment After Meritor: Much Ado About Nothing, 42
ARK. L REV. 795, 806 (1989) (supervisor creates employer liability not only from ability to
hire and fire but through capacity to make personnel decisions and power to pressure and
frighten employees).
The intimidation of losing a job or benefit occurs whether or not the particular victim is
outwardly threatened with losing a particular job benefit. See Lipsett v. University of P.R.,
864 F.2d 881, 900 (lst Cir. 1988). The employer will be liable absent notice because
"when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate, that supervisor is almost always aided
in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.... whether or not he or
she expressly threatens that subordinate by referring to the authority delegated." Id.; see
also Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1054-55 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 798
F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986) (supervisor's mere ability to take job benefit from employee gen-
erates liability rather than actual exercise of that power).
"' See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1990). The Shager court held
that torts of a supervisor with the power to hire and fire are within the scope of employ-
ment and will create employer liability. Id.; see also Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 900 (supervisors
influence over low-level workers produces employer liability); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819
F.2d 630, 636 (6th Cir. 1987) (employer is responsible for supervisor's sexual misbehavior
toward employee due to foreseeability of its occurrence); Turner, supra note 45, at 9 (hos-
tile environment created by supervisor will give rise to employer liability).
" See Robert Lewis, Equity Eludes Women, AARP BUL.ETIN, Nov. 10, 1991, at 1. The
author recognized an unequal treatment of men and women, and found that "the earnings
gap between the sexes [has] narrowed during the 1980s, but .... [wiomen of all ages are
paid about 72 cents for every dollar that men earn." Id. At the end of the 1950s, women
assumed the role of mother and homemaker, but today women are moving into higher
paying nontraditional jobs and devoting less time to the family. Id. Sociologist Barbara
Reskin of Ohio State University states that "[glenerally the more men in the occupation,
the higher the pay." Id. Furthermore "[tihere is disturbing evidence that as women make
significant inroads into formerly male-dominated jobs, those jobs are at risk of becoming
female dominated, with corresponding wage loss or stagnation." Id. Since sexual harass-
ment has more to do with power than gender, nonsexist promotion of women into power-
ful positions will help alleviate the problem; see also Sepler, supra note 2, at 69 (analyzing
ways to prevent sexual harassment); Goleman, supra note 2, at C I1 (finding power to be
main impetus behind sexual harassment).
89 See Yates, 819 F.2d at 636. The Yates court found that the basic question when using
agency principles is whether the act complained of occurred within the scope of the agent's
employment. Id. To resolve this issue, it is necessary to review such factors as where and
when the act took place, and whether it was foreseeable. Id.; see also AGENCY, supra note 67,
§ 230. Section 230 specifically provides that "lain act, although forbidden, or done in a
forbidden manner, may be within the scope of employment." Id. If the harassment oc-
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exception to strict liability when employers impose and enforce
strict anti-harassment policies, because a supervisor will no longer
be acting under any color of authority. In that event, liability
should only be imposed by proving an employer acted negli-
gently.90 Negligence could be shown when the employer, with ac-
tual or constructive knowledge of the harassment, fails to take
reasonable action to remedy the harassment,9 or when the em-
ployer does not take reasonable care in his selection of
supervisors.92
curred at the place of business, during working hours, and was carried out by someone
with the authority to hire, fire, promote, and discipline the plaintiff, it would be considered
foreseeable and the employer will be liable. Yates, 819 F.2d at 636 (quoting AGENCY, supra
note 67, § 230). See generally Turner, supra note 45, at 45 (Yates holding equivalent to strict
liability directly rejected in Meritor).
" See Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1989). Employ-
ment policies against sexual harassment make it clear that such practices are not within the
range of the supervisor's responsibilities. Id. Liability will be imposed on the employer for
a hostile environment if he is negligent. Id.; Dristin D. Sanko, Employer Liability and Sexual
Harassment Under Section 1983: A Comment on Starrett v. Wadley, 67 DENy U. L REV 571,
583 (1990). More liberal positions advancing employer liability would compel safeguards
against sexual harassment and easily eliminate sex bias. Id. See generally Sperry, supra note
12, at 918 (if employer has implemented policy to deal with sexual harassment and em-
ployee fails to take advantage of such policy, liability will not be imposed absent
knowledge).
" See Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1314 (1 1th Cir. 1989). The
Steele court held that when an employee does not act as an agent, liability will attach only if
the employer knew or should have known of the abusive condition and he failed to take
prompt remedial action. Id.; see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 1991)
(following "knowledge-no reasonable action" theory to impose liability on employer who
constructively knew of harassment through his agent); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
F.2d 1406, 1417 (1987) (employer liable for negligently or recklessly allowing sexually an-
tagonistic work atmosphere), affd, 928 F.2d 966 (10th Cir. 1991).
Such corrective action must be reasonably calculated to prevent the hostile environment
from continuing. See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 108 (4th Cir. 1989) (em-
ployer may be liable even if he took remedial action if that action was not rationally calcu-
lated to halt harassment): Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 479 (5th Cir.
1989) (action of employer in sexual harassment case must be appropriate): Dwyer v. Smith,
867 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1989) (employer liability may be rebutted if remedial action
was reasonably determined to end harassment); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d
424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984) (same): Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (same):
Elisa Kircher Cole, Recent Legal Developments in Sexual Harassment, 13 J.C. & UL. 267, 273
(1986) (same): William Martucci, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Legal Overview, 3
LAn. LAW. 125, 135 (1987) (remedial action must be suitable to correct problem); Egan,
supra note 6, at 386 (reasonably calculated entails more than merely showing that blanket
policy against sexual harassment existed).
" See Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 30 (1990) (employer would be liable for injuries
caused by negligently selected employees); Paroline, 879 F.2d at 112 (cause of action can
arise from employer's negligent hiring of employees who cause injury); Hall v. Gus Constr.
Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (employer will be liable for act of negligent
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Many courts have shown a willingness to impose liability when
an employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the abusive
environment and failed to take prompt remedial action reasonably
calculated to stop the harassment.3 Constructive knowledge is
found where the sexual harassment is so pervasive that the em-
ployer should have known that the conduct existed."4 This ap-
proach to supervisory sexual harassment will force the employer
to eradicate abusive working enviorments, while protecting those
employers that take appropriate measures against it.95
The second level of the bifurcation, which deals with a co-em-
hiring); Jill Fedje, Liability for Sexual Abuse: The Anomalous Immunity of Churches, 9 LAW &
INEQ J. 133, 148 (1990) (recognizing employers direct liability for negligent hiring); Mary
Robb, Bad Samaritans Make Dangerous Precedent: The Perils of Holding an Employer Liable for
an Employee's Sexual Misconduct, 8 ALASKA L. REV 181, 187 (1991) (same).
" See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1991). The Dan-
iels court found that in order for a hostile environment claim to be valid under Title VII,
the plaintiff must prove that the employer had knowledge of the harassment and did not
take timely corrective action. Id.; YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region v. NLRB, 914 F.2d
1442, 1458 (10th Cir. 1990) (once employer learns of sexual mistreatment, duty arises to
take immediate action to remedy situation); Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 913 F.2d 463,
464 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1015 (8th Cir. 1989)
(liability arises when upper level employee knew or should have known of harassment and
no remedial procedures were invoked); Hall, 842 F.2d at 1015 (adopted "knowledge-no
action" approach to find employer liable for discrimination when supervisors sexually
harassed plaintiff); Jules 1. Crystal, Developments in Sex Discrimination Law 1989-1990, in EM-
PIOYMENT LITIGATION 1990, at 571, 574 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 397, 1990) (knowledge and failure to rectify situation quickly are needed ele-
ments to establish prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment).
11 See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 (finding employer aware of co-employee's sexual harass-
ment due to pervasiveness); Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1515-16 (employer deemed to have
constructive knowledge when harassment persistent or when agent of employer had knowl-
edge): Waltman, 875 F.2d at 485 (finding liability to apply only when harassment perva-
sive): Katz, 709 F.2d at 256 (knowledge, even though not actual, is established when sexual
abuse is so extensive that employer should have known of conduct): Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11 th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff must show actual or constructive
knowledge and failure to cure for employer liability); Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 697 F.
Supp. 204, 219 (E.D. Va. 1988) (employer should have known of employee's harassment
because it was pervasive, and is responsible for supervisor's harassment because knowledge
is imputed), affid, 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990). The circuit court on appeal added that "of
course .... where the sexual harassment is committed by one of the employer's supervi-
sors, this element [of knowledgel is automatically met because ... knowledge of the harass-
ment is imputed to the employer through its agent-supervisor." Id.; Merriman & Yang,
supra note 7, at 99 (employer liability exists when employer knew or had constructive
knowledge of misconduct and failed to remedy it).
15 See Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1436 (7th Cir. 1988). The Volk court stated that the
best way to eradicate sex discrimination is "by enforcing a strict liability rule that ensures
compensation for victims and creates an incentive for the employer to take the strongest
possible affirmative measures to prevent the hiring and retention of sexist supervisors." Id.
(quoting Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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ployee's sexual harassment, would apply the doctine of respondeat
superior."' However, since the co-employee has no authority, the
conduct would not be within the scope of employment 9 7 and em-
ployer negligence must be shown.9 8 The negligence approach
would encourage a harassment-free workplace, as envisioned by
Title VII, by compelling the employer to act in furtherance of
preventing or remedying sexually abusive work environments. 99
CONCLUSION
Sexual harassment has recently catapulted to the forefront of
national awareness. As a result, many women have become deter-
mined to break the barrier of sexual harassment that has contin-
ued to compound their feelings of powerlessness in the workplace.
See generally Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 135 (Ala. 1972) (respondeat superior
imposes liability when employee commits tort during the scope of employment): Hardy v.
Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 1985) (same); Murell v. Goertz, 597 P.2d 1223, (Okla.
Ct. App. 1979) (same).
9' See Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990). In Dias, the court
held that an employer is liable for a co-employees' acts under respondeat superior doctrine
when acting within the scope of employment. Id.; see also Yates v. Avco Corp, 819 F.2d
630, 211 (6th Cir. 1987) (respondeat superior not applicable when tortious act not in fur-
therance of employer's purpose).
9" See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) (1990). This statute states in pertinent part: "With respect
to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows
or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appro-
priate corrective action." Id.: Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572,
577 (10th Cir. 1990) (since sexual harassment is not within scope of co-employee's employ-
ment, liability found when employer knows or should have known of conduct and failed to
take immediate corrective action): Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d I 311,
1316 (11 th Cir. 1989) (liability requires knowledge of employees tortious act and failure to
remedy): Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 901 (Ist Cir. 1988) (embraced
"knowledge-no reasonable action" standard when tortious act was committed by lower
level employees). For courts which have mislabeled this negligence standard as respondeat
superior, see Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 572 and Vance v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863
F.2d 1503, 1512 (1 1th Cir. 1989); cf Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1421
(7th Cir. 1986) (respondeat superior supplies derivative liability whereas negligence and
recklessness provide direct liability); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554,
1557 n.1 (11 th Cir. 1987) (through operation of respondeat superior doctrine, employer
may be liable to employee for working environment sexual harassment of nonemployees
(citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902, 905 n.9 (11th Cir. 1982))).
" See Sepler, supra note 2, at 74. Sepler found that the best tool against sexual harass-
ment is prevention. Id. The author advised employees to: "(1) adopt a policy against sexual
harassment: (2) adopt a complaint procedure; (3) educate supervisors; (4) investigate com-
plaints: (5) take appropriate action once the investigation is complete." Id.; see also 137
CONc REC H 1662-01 (daily ed. March 12, 1991) (noting Title VII is tool "for combatting
discrimination").
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Those who have been victimized have resorted to the courts in
increasing numbers to combat the abuse which is often trivialized
by society. This increase in litigation has spurred the need for uni-
form standards to determine when conduct is actionable and when
liability will be imposed. The reasonable victim standard offers the
most viable approach to accomplishing this goal.
To extinguish sexual harassment in the workplace, the business
community must educate employees as to what constitutes unac-
ceptable behavior, and adopt and enforce strict policies against
such behavior. Although some steps have been initiated, sexual
harassment will not be eliminated unless businesses strictly enforce
such policies against the harassers. To ensure the implementation
of these practices, courts should hold employers strictly liable
when they have failed to provide adequate protection to employ-
ees victimized by supervisors and negligently liable for co-em-
ployee's harassment. Without adopting and enforcing such poli-
cies, sexual harassment will persist, and ingrained notions of
inequality based on sex will continue to perpetuate discrimination
in the workplace.
Marie E. Kaiser & Anthony J. LaPorta
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